To enable us to correct the constitution, the whole constitution must be viewed together; and it must be compared with the actual state of the people, and the circumstances of the time.
Edmund Burke
Can a constitution be unconstitutional? In most countries this is not a question that is generally given serious consideration. We might also think the query slightly bizarre, rather like asking whether the Bible can be unbiblical. But it is, in fact, a profoundly important question-for students of constitutionalism and for both the citizens and prospective citizens of a constitutional regime. The latter category included the great mathematician Kurt Gödel, who, as a well-known anecdote has it, entertained last minute doubts about acquiring American citizenship after discovering that under article 5 it would be possible to change the Constitution into something with which he, a refugee from Nazi tyranny, would not wish to be associated. parameters of article 5 would itself have been held to be an abuse of the amendment provision. 5 We can only speculate about whether the implications of such an entrenchment were sufficiently revolutionary to give pause to even the most committed defender of amendatory prerogative. That question aside, my principal purpose in this article is to draw upon a rich vein of jurisprudential thinking from judiciaries outside of the United States to address the puzzle of the unconstitutional constitutional amendment. If U.S. jurisprudence has been spare in its consideration of the question, other national courts have given it detailed attention and reflection. Indeed, more judicial commentary on the subject may be found coming from Africa and Latin America than from the bench of the U.S. Supreme Court. 6 The most recent examination is in an extensive treatment of the issue by the Supreme Court in Peru, which, while upholding the constitutional amendment in question, embraced the concept that it had the authority to do otherwise. 7 According to the Court, all institutions must be faithful to the Constitution, including the Congress. The idea that the reform of the Constitution is a political act that cannot be revised by the judiciary was rejected; thus, it is the Peruvian Court that must guarantee the Constitution's principles (principios juridicos) and basic democratic values (valores democraticos basicos). 8 It is, however, in India where the debate has been pursued at greatest length and where one finds the most daring and innovative decisions on the reach of constitutional power. Of course, opinions in India go to great lengths about all manner of things; still, the patient reader will be amply rewarded by a discussion of constitutional maintenance and change whose comprehensiveness is unrivalled in world jurisprudence. Nevertheless, this will not be a discourse on the activism of the Indian Supreme Court; in fact, before arriving on the subcontinent I want to make 5 The text of the Corwin amendment: ''No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.'' Cong. Globe, 36 th Cong., a stop in Ireland, where the categorical rejection of implied limits on constitutional amendments is, perhaps, as surprising as is the openness to the idea in India. Ultimately, though, my concern is less with the experiences of these countries than it is with the ways in which we theorize about constitutions. For those polities that are constitutional democracies in more than name only, the classic tension between popular governance and restraints on power has been addressed through sovereignty-based arguments that suppose that, in the limitations imposed on the expression of the popular will, there exists a more profound manifestation of democratic legitimacy, the constituent power. This is the power that represents the people in a regime's foundational enactment, which is activated, according to some, on those occasions when the trigger of formal constitutional transformation is pulled, and which, according to others, can only be approximated in these subsequent amendments. The conflation of parliamentary and popular sovereignty that allowed the British to function without a written constitution was a fiction that Americans, in establishing a new nation, were required to reject. 9 Their new fiction allowed them to establish a basis for the belief that other institutions-principally the Court-could, through the invocation of a written constitution, embody the original popular will and, in this way, legitimately check democratic transgressions. On balance it has proved to be a useful fiction. I want to suggest that we reduce our dependency on theorizing predominantly in these terms because it has sometimes obstructed clear thinking about constitutionalism and, specifically, about constitutional change. Those who have argued for implicit limits on the power of amendment have often invoked the theory of popular sovereignty, and those who have opposed them have, just as often, found the theory sufficiently supple to provide justification for their counterarguments. So, on one side, we have arguments that use popular sovereignty to establish the immutability of certain constitutional rights; as, for example, in Jeffrey Rosen's claim that ''By refusing to enforce the Flag Burning Amendment, a Court would defer to, rather than thwart, the sovereign will of the people.''
Here we hear the echoes of James Madison, who insisted ''The people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter constitutions as they pleased. '' 12 Madison, of course, also famously cautioned against ''frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the whole society,'' concerned as he was not to ''deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on every thing.'' 13 And there is, in addition, a further difficulty to disturb one's philosophical equanimity: What if the people exercise their presumed constituent authority to destroy the Constitution in the name of change and progress?
14 Edmund Burke, no great friend of popular sovereignty, to be sure, nonetheless can help to solve the amendment puzzle. It is not, however, this thinker's coolness toward the consent of the governed that I embrace. Burke spent a career being mainly correct about India, Ireland, and the United States. His opposition to the tyrannies of George III in America and Warren Hastings in India were directed at both of these rulers' abstract appeals to sovereign rights. Ultimately, though, his attractiveness, here, transcends his notable political track record and lies in the clarifying lens he offers into critical issues of constitutional change. I refer, specifically, to his depiction of the nation as an ''idea of continuity,'' his commitment to a politics of identity uncompromised by the destructive lure of ''geographical morality'' (that is, a morality only relevant and relative to its locale), and his elevation of reform as a strategy to conserve the fundamentals of constitutional structure. But first I want to explore the dilemma of the unconstitutional amendment in two nations where it has given rise to some fascinating and instructive jurisprudence. 14 Lest anyone worry about the scope of my ambitions, I hasten to add that challenging ''government of the people, by the people, and for the people'' is not my purpose here, although it may be of more than passing interest that the author of that immortal prose once saw fit to refer to popular sovereignty as ''a pernicious abstraction.'' The abstract character of the discourse on sovereignty is, of course, present throughout its history. As Gordon Wood has noted, the doctrine of sovereignty ''was the single most important abstraction of politics in the entire Revolutionary era.'' GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 345 (Univ. N.C. Press 1969).
1.
In 1934, at Arbour Hill Military Detention Barracks in Ireland a special tribunal was meting out summary justice under the terms of an amendment adopted three years earlier to the Irish Free Constitution of 1922. Perhaps the only thing uncontroversial about that amendment was that it was inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution as originally enacted. By authorizing the exercise of judicial power by persons who were not judges appointed in the manner provided for by the constitution, it permitted actions in clear violation of at least two articles clearly set out in the document. Passed as a Public Safety Act, the amendment could not be mistaken for an emergency measure, as it conferred upon the executive permanent authority to exercise its special powers whenever, in its uncontrolled discretion, it deemed it expedient to do so. Thus the terms of the amendment could be put into effect during conditions of absolute peace, and under these terms the tribunals could do just about anything, including sentencing people to death without a semblance of due process. As the one dissenting judge in State (Lemmon) v. Ryan pointed out, ''The more one dwells [on its provisions] the more one is staggered by the contemplation of the range of its operations and the scope of the matters authorized by [them] .'' 15 The provisions were, according to this judge, ''the antithesis of the rule of law,'' bringing Ireland alarmingly close to ''the rule of anarchy.''
16
The objection to this constitutional monstrosity was that it was too radical fairly to be considered anything other than a de facto repeal of the constitution. As an assault on the basic scheme and principles of that document, it could only be upheld under the principle of lex posterior, according to which the recentness of a law establishes its priority over an earlier law of the same type. This also describes the essential process of parliamentary supremacy, which is, of course, a very British way of doing things. And so one might have imagined that rejection of the amendment could have been a source of satisfaction for Irish judges seeking to affirm their nationalist bona fides. But only a single justice, Hugh Kennedy, who was, in fact, a nationalist lawyer and one of the drafters of the constitution, was so inclined, ''a lone voice,'' as he was later to be called, ''crying in a positivistic wilderness. '' 17 The majority justices were unmoved by Justice Kennedy's argument that any purported amendment repugnant to natural law would necessarily be unconstitutional and hence null and void. While not denying that the provision in question would be impossible to justify as an act sanctioned by God, they firmly asserted a judicial incapacity to determine what constitutional features were fundamental and what were not, which left the legislature, within the constraints of correct procedure, with total freedom to amend in any manner it saw fit. In response to the claim that a constitutional authority to amend provisions had to be distinguished from an unauthorized power to repeal them, Justice Gerald Fitzgibbon cited the Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution as evidence for the fact that amendments need not only add or clarify. Of course, the repeal of prohibition left the essential character of the U.S. Constitution unchanged, thus making it a curious example to help legitimate the repeal of due process in the Irish constitution. But the reference underscores the central point in the majority's ruling: distinguishing essential constitutional features from nonessential ones is ultimately an exercise in imponderables. ''As a provision is not incorporated into a Constitution unless it is regarded as of fundamental importance, the distinction between Articles of primary and secondary importance is difficult to maintain.'' 18 Moreover, there was no purpose in invoking a ''spirit embodied in [the] original Constitution'' to prevent the enactment of provisions antagonistic to it. And so, given this view of the constitution, the Court easily reached the one conclusion that was logically required by its reasoning: ''In cases where the Legislature professes to amend the Constitution itself, the only function of the Court is to see that the proposed Amendment is within the scope of the power granted by the Constitution, and that the requisite forms insisted upon by the Constitution shall have been duly observed. '' 19 Among the constitutional theorists writing at this time, the one who would have been least surprised by this result was not an Irishman but a German-Carl Schmitt. While doubtless preoccupied with his own country's rendezvous with constitutional disintegration, he might well have viewed what was happening in Ireland as confirmation of his controversial ideas about the inadequacies of the liberal state. That the amendment process in Ireland culminated in a result he would have applauded-the transfer of all power to the executive-should not obscure the fact that, in doing so, it provided a compelling demonstration of what Schmitt saw as the fundamental flaw at the heart of constitutional liberalism. An amendment process functioning in total indifference to itself and its own system of legality was a testament to the blind subordination of substance to form that was the basis of modern constitutionalism, of which, of course, Weimar was exhibit A. In such a system, Schmitt wrote, ''a purely formal concept of law, independent of all content, is conceivable and tolerable.'' Schmitt might have recognized in the opinions of the prevailing justices in Ryan echoes of his positivist adversaries in the twenties. He would have seen the same conflation of parliamentary and popular sovereignty that could sustain the imagination in visualizing the constituent power whenever constitutional change emerged from the legislature. 21 His own conception of the sovereign will of the people identified it with certain principles of substantive law that could, on the one hand, justify the infamous Enabling Act (Ermachtigungsgesetz) of 1933, by which the Nazis commenced their descent into pseudolegal hell, and, on the other, resist the dominant interpretation of article 76, by which the constitution could be amended in an infinite variety of ways. 22 It was a conception whose reach extended to India, when, in the tumultuous decade of the seventies, Schmitt again provided theoretical support for both sides in a struggle between dictatorial power and the judicial forces arrayed against it. But before departing Ireland, it is important to see how a different court under a different constitution arrived at a very similar result with regard to the amendment issue. This Constitution for the Republic of Ireland was inaugurated with Eamon de Valera's proclamation that ''If there is one thing more than any other that is clear and shining through this whole Constitution, it is the fact that the people are the masters.'' 23 It included an amendment provision that required a popular referendum as the final step in any alteration of the document. The requirement was satisfied when, in 1995, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, providing for a right to receive and impart information relating to abortion services lawfully available outside the state. A bill passed under its authority was submitted 21 This article addresses only the kind of formal constitutional change that occurs through the amendment process. There is a vast literature that is concerned with constitutional transformation occurring outside of the officially designated procedures set out in constitutional provisions. In this regard, the work of Bruce Ackerman has been critically important. His ongoing We the People project is devoted to the understanding that the people are the source of all legitimate constitutional change, both formal and informal. Sanford Levinson has drawn attention to the affinities between Ackerman's popular sovereignty-based theory of constitutional change and the views of Carl Schmitt. For Levinson, the ''sovereignty-oriented positivism'' of both of these theorists would lead them (contra Jeffrey Rosen and others) to accept as legitimate the repeal of the First Amendment as long as this decision emanated from the authentic voice of the demos. Sanford Levinson, Transitions, 108 YALE L.J. 2215, 2224 (1999). 22 As the German scholar Dietrich Conrad has pointed out, the Enabling Act was considered at the time to be a legitimate use of the amending power, and thus its revolutionary implications in creating unsupervised dictatorial power should not be seen as an example of emergency power. to the Court for constitutional review, and, as part of the challenge to its legality, the claim was made that the amendment itself was unconstitutional. It was said to be in direct conflict with the Eighth Amendment, which acknowledges the right to life of the unborn. Imagine for a moment the passage in the United States of the flag-burning amendment, and the sure objection that it violated the guarantee of free speech under the First Amendment, and you have the case that confronted the Irish Court. Imagine, too, a further claim that, in addition to the allegation concerning a conflict between two provisions, the newer amendment should not be allowed to stand because it repudiates principles of natural justice embodied in the Constitution. This, recall, was the core of Jeffrey Rosen's effort to put into play the idea that if the flag amendment were to be adopted it deserved to be nullified by the Court. A similar effort was undertaken in Ireland, with greater ease actually, since the natural law commitments of its Constitution were, in contrast with the United States, much more explicitly set out in the language of the document. The counsel for the unborn, as they were called, maintained that the Court could not enforce any provision of a law or amendment that was contrary to natural law. And so the question was The lead opinion by Justice Liam Hamilton was emphatic in its response: ''The Court does not accept this argument.'' 25 Without denying either that there was a conflict between two amendments or that the Abortion Information Amendment ran afoul of constitutionally significant natural law precepts, the Court confidently upheld the Fourteenth Amendment as the legitimate expression of the will of the people. In affirming the supremacy of popular sovereignty, it effectively left unimpeded the people's right to amend the Constitution. As in the earlier Ryan case, it was the sovereign prerogative that was decisive; the change from one constitution to another, however significant as a historical transformation to real independence, was of no consequence with respect to intraconstitutional transformation through the amendment process. It mattered not at all that the first transformation was marked by the replacement of parliamentary by popular sovereignty; ultimately the same reasoning dictated the same positivist result.
To make clear that this result was not an anomaly somehow driven by the special status of the abortion issue in Irish politics, a trilogy of cases decided in the late nineties, in which the Court waxed worshipfully at the altar 24 Clear and unambiguous as this is, one should be mindful that the Irish Constitution begins ''In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred. . . .'' While there are limits to how seriously to take that language, or, indeed, the language of any Constitution's preamble, how are we to reconcile the democratic positivism of the Court's decisions with some of the text in the body of the Constitution, language that was clearly inspired by the same divine authority? For example, article 41 recognizes the family as ''a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.'' 29 In Ireland being a good constitutional positivist means showing a proper respect for natural law. This is not to say that the outcome in the abortion case was wrong, only that the reasoning in it was instructively deficient. The referendum requirement in the 1937 Constitution's amendment provisions enabled the Court to invoke the constituent authority of the people as cover for its inability or unwillingness to engage the threshold question of what precisely an amendment is, or, for that matter, the antecedent question of what a constitution is. The idea that any duly enacted amendment to the Constitution carried with it the legitimating aura of sovereign authority embodied the brilliant obfuscation of a noble fiction. If the Irish decisions provided a weak response to Schmitt's critique of proceduralism, then insisting that the validity of a formal constitutional change was conditional on its strict adherence to natural law, as was argued in the dissent in Ryan or in the right-to-life brief in the abortioninformation case or in the claims made by Rosen in objecting to the proposed flag amendment, also fails. None of these arguments explains why a right, even one thought to have a natural endowment, cannot be modified by ''addition or variation.'' Modifications, after all, are basic to our enjoyment of rights in civil society. As to the question of ''repeal,'' there may very well be grounds for principled resistance to excision of a constitutionally prescribed guarantee, but the claim on behalf of resistance still would have to be made based on a demonstration that the result of this more radical change is at least constitutionally incoherent. By this I mean it would have to show not just that something important has changed but that the change has, in some deep sense, disturbed the fundamentals of constitutional identity. To see how this argument unfolds, we need to go to India.
2.
It is here, in India, where the words of Lincoln's first inaugural address take on a special significance. They are words that invite us to be very particular in what we comprehend by the power to amend, such that the kind of change that inspired Gödel's hesitation could only properly come about through extraconstitutional deliverance. ''This country . . . ,'' Lincoln said, ''belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they should grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it. ' of constitutive restructuring-amendment and dismemberment; to elaborate its meaning is to describe the signal achievement of Indian jurisprudence.
It is an imperfect achievement made possible only by the dictatorial ambitions of a politician bearing the two most revered names in modern Indian history. Moreover, it is an achievement that, like the success of Indian democracy itself, seems somehow counterintuitive. The Indian Constitution, after all, was designed to accomplish the goal of radical social reconstruction. To this end, as one of the early justices of the Supreme Court pointed out, ''The Constitution-makers visualized that Parliament would be competent to make amendments . . . so as to meet the challenge of the problems which may arise in the course of socio-economic progress and development of the country.'' 33 The provision for amending the document was shaped expressly to conform with the Jeffersonian idea that each generation should be free to adapt the Constitution to the conditions of its time. Borrowing also from the Irish experience, the framers included a section in the Constitution devoted entirely to Directive Principles of State Policy, a section that came to assume a place of prominence in subsequent constitutional development that it never attained in its place of origin. Indeed, the Irish have been a frequent source of inspiration for many Indians, as is amusingly evident in an Indian judge's slightly amended reference to Justice Fitzgibbon's opinion in the Ryan case. ''This . . . Eden demi-paradise, this precious stone, set in the silver sea, this blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this India. If it is not that today, let us strive to make it so by using law as a flexible instrument of social order. '' 34 Add to this effusive embrace of change a legal culture rooted in the British legal tradition, and it is natural to suppose a hostile Indian reception to the notion of implied constitutional limits. Thus, it is not surprising for a judge to declare: ''The power of amendment is in point of quality an adjunct of sovereignty. If so, it does not admit of any limitations. '' 35 What, then, might explain the surprising receptivity to the idea? Perhaps the answer lies, at least in part, in judicial practice developed in constitutional domains at the core of Indian self-understanding, most prominently the question of secular identity. Thus, in formulating an appropriate constitutional response to a religious presence that is pervasive and deep, Indian judges have proceeded along a path that their U.S. counterparts have studiously avoided. But how to determine what remains and what is subject to change? In its wrestling with the amendment issue, the Indian Supreme Court has struggled mightily with this perplexity. On the one hand, its task has been less difficult than confronting the challenge of religion, where the Court's authority to make this distinction was always more dubiously asserted; on the other hand, its effort has been complicated by the fact that the key cases testing the limits of the amendment power have directly implicated the justices' own institutional self-interest. A very brief outline of the progression of these cases should be sufficient to pursue the logic of the Court's rather weakly theorized, if boldly formulated, rationale for its chosen path.
Unlike the episodic character of the Irish experience, India's history with the amendment problem presents a compelling narrative. Indeed, there are at least two stories one can tell, the first concerning a decades-long political give and take over the place of private property in India, and the second featuring a protracted struggle by the Supreme Court to establish its credibility and independence in the face of repeated attempts to diminish its standing as a significant force in Indian politics. These stories are tightly entwined and are distinguishable only by the theme one chooses to emphasize. In both accounts they are dominated by the looming presence of Indira Gandhi.
The use of the amendment process to insulate certain issues from judicial oversight began in the early days of the republic, long before Mrs. Gandhi's ascension to power. . Because religion in India is so deeply embedded in the existing social structure, indifference to the substance of religious belief is a much costlier indulgence than it is in places where the spiritual and temporal are not so tightly entwined.
over the claim that the process had been used to deprive landowners of fundamental property rights guaranteed under the document. 39 Technically, the decision did not invalidate the amendments in question, as the Court issued a prospective judgment essentially putting Parliament on notice that the days of its amendatory interference with fundamental rights were over. But the intense political reaction to the Court's move left little doubt that something very important had occurred. The opinions in the case were noteworthy more for having established a foundation for debating the meaning of constitutional change than for the quality of the judges' own initial contributions, which were, for the most part, underdeveloped. The main opinion by the chief justice introduced the critical question of what the word ''amend'' actually means; his preference for a limited understanding must be seen in connection with his main point, which was that ''fundamental rights are given a transcendental position under our Constitution and are kept beyond the reach of Parliament. ' that ended in electoral triumph in 1971. 45 Her substantial victory quickly translated into passage of no less than four constitutional amendments, one of which-the Twenty-fourth-explicitly overturned the earlier decision on fundamental rights, extending to Parliament the authority to adopt amendments that were immune from judicial review. War with Pakistan precipitated a declaration of presidential emergency and subsequent nationalization, which, in turn, led to the litigation that ended in the landmark judgment in Kesavananda. Its massive content (approximately 800 pages) and numerous crosscutting opinions are not conducive to easy recapitulation. In essence the Court-seven of the thirteen participating judges-affirmed the authority of Parliament to amend constitutional provisions involving fundamental rights, while rejecting its authority to place statutes enacted to implement the Constitution's Directive Principles beyond the power of judicial review. It thus reversed Golak Nath but narrowly asserted its own authority to invalidate a constitutional amendment that was in defiance of the ''basic structure'' of the Indian Constitution. While relenting on its authority to designate specific provisions as immune from constitutional change, the majority invested the Court with a broader supervisory jurisdiction over the fundamental meaning of the document. 46 In the fashion of Marbury v. Madison, the Court avoided a direct confrontation with the government, yet appreciably strengthened its powers in anticipation of battles ahead. And so the era of natural rights in India was short-lived. Should any legitimacy attach to the idea of implied limits to the amendment power, it would not be found in natural rights arguments. While there were differences on the Court over epistemological questions concerning such rights, a broad consensus emerged that ''Fundamental rights . . . are given by the Constitution, and, therefore, they can be abridged or taken away by the . . . amending process of the Constitution itself.'' 47 The judges were mindful of how arguments from natural rights had been employed elsewhere-notably in the United States-to impede efforts to achieve greater social and economic 45 As noted by Granville Austin, the Court's decision ''was a masterpiece of unintentional timing, for it gave Mrs. Gandhi a cause and an enemy in her quest for renewed power.'' Supra note 41, at 198. 46 The essence of the Court's ruling is in line with William Harris's theoretical reflections on constitutional change. ''Even for important existing features it would seem that rather than ranging over the constitutional scheme to pick out elements that might arguably be more fundamental in the hierarchy of values, it would be more advisable to develop essential principles that would guide a choice as to whether a particular Constitutional change were substantively invalid. That is, a Constitutional provision would be fundamental only in terms of some articulated political theory that makes sense of the whole Constitution.'' WILLIAM HARRIS, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 188 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1993).
equality, and they seemed determined to avoid the potential damage to constitutional values associated with the ambiguity surrounding these rights. A characteristically Indian objection expressed what is, for better or worse, a reality of our time: ''Natural law has been a sort of religion with many political and constitutional thinkers. But it has never believed in a single Godhead. It has a perpetually growing pantheon. . . . The pantheon is not a heaven of peace. Its gods are locked in internecine conflict. '' 48 Notice that this rejection of a rights-based bar to first-order constitutional change did not culminate in acceptance of the government's extraordinary argument to the Court that Parliament could do anything it wanted through the amendment power, no matter how revolutionary or destructive. To be sure, the ghost of Oliver Wendell Holmes returned-and with a vengeancebut only to a small minority of the justices, among whom Justice Y.V. Chandrachud was most expansive: ''If the people acting through the Parliament want to put the Crown of a King on a head they like, or if you please, on a head they dislike . . . let them have that liberty. . .
. [As Justice
Holmes said], '[W]hen the people . . . want to do something I can't find anything in the Constitution expressly forbidding them to do it, I say, whether I like it or not: God-dammit it, let'em do it.'' 49 But these sentiments ultimately lost out to the proponents of ''basic structure,'' a doctrine that might not have made it very far beyond the ruling in this case had it not been for the overreaching of the Indian prime minister. On June 12, 1975, a high court judge in Mrs. Gandhi's electoral constituency upheld charges against her for the crime of electoral fraud. Two weeks later, faced with the possibility of removal from office, she introduced India's first domestically driven emergency regime, which quickly evolved into a harsh and unremitting dictatorship. Among its first acts were a series of constitutional amendments that were, shall we say, unusual. One of them, the Thirty-ninth Amendment, prevented any judicial inquiry into the election of the prime minister. As one noted Indian legal scholar remarked, ''Nowhere in the history of mankind has the power to amend a Constitution thus been used. '' 50 Another, the Thirty-eighth, shielded from judicial review any laws adopted during the emergency that might conceivably impinge upon fundamental rights. Gandhi's claim was Schmittian in the extreme; in essence, the constituent power, as an expression of the sovereign will of the people, was all-embracing and at once judicial, executive, and legislative. An unconstitutional constitution? A comparative perspectivedebate over property-related amendments had failed to do-establish the legitimacy of the unconstitutional constitutional amendment. This was too much even for the aforementioned Holmesian justice, who perhaps experienced an epiphany, in the face of these events, concluding that the Constitution could indeed be subverted by revolutionary methods, and that constitutional provisions should not, after all, be the vehicle for such change. While Mrs. Gandhi's election was prudently upheld, the Court decisively repudiated the Thirty-eighth and Thirty-ninth Amendments. ''The common man's sense of justice sustains democracies, '' 51 wrote another of the prime minister's expected judicial supporters, and the outrage provoked by these travesties must, he felt, be given due regard in determining the attributes of basic structure. In particular, these provisions were a blatant negation of the right of equality and were in sharp contravention of the most basic postulate of the Constitution. Hence, following Kesavananda, they could not stand. Of course, one could question just how meaningful these developments were in light of the unusual circumstances that brought them about. That is why the last of the cases in this brief summary-involving a government takeover of a failing business-is so important. what he called ''the theme song of Kesavananda,'' for which he was now fully prepared to become a part of the chorus. ''Amend as you may even the solemn document which the founding fathers have committed to your care, for you know best the needs of your generation. But, the Constitution is a precious heritage; therefore you cannot destroy its identity.'' 54 3.
The legal scholar Frederick Schauer has asked: ''What makes a constitution constitutional?'' ''Nothing,'' he answered, ''nor does or can anything make a constitution unconstitutional. ' another answer, even if much of the jurisprudence that emerged was forged in the extreme circumstances of emergency power, and much of what was innovative about the line of cases flowed from the Court's own institutional needs. One lesson to draw from them might be to follow the Brazilian example and preclude the enactment of constitutional amendments during periods of emergency. 56 But surely more can be learned from an account of this legal history; moreover, the rather extreme conditions that provided the context for what judicially transpired are, in fact, useful in clarifying the stakes in the debate over implied limits. Hence we should not be surprised to learn that it was the German experience that offered the Indian judges guidance in their extended parrying of Indira Gandhi. 57 She, of course, had a lot to learn from that experience as well, if, alas, from an earlier decade. But both the judges and the prime minister could find in the person of Carl Schmitt a source of ideas for their conflicting agendas, for that enigmatic theorist is at once the guru of emergency power and the proponent of the notion that there are fundamental principles limiting the amendment power. Indeed, his argument that the amendment power was not an expression or reincarnation of the original constituent power, and thus limited under its original mandate, was incorporated into the jurisprudence of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic. While never actually invalidating a constitutional amendment, the postwar German Court has declared such an act conceptually possible and has expressly invoked the nation's recent past to affirm that never again would formal legal means be used to legalize a totalitarian regime. 58 The Southwest Case, BverfGE 1, 14 (1951): ''That a constitutional provision itself may be null and void, is not conceptually impossible just because it is a part of the constitution. There are constitutional provisions that are so fundamental and to such an extent an expression of a law that precedes even the constitution that they also bind the framer of the constitution, and other constitutional provisions that do not rank so high may be null and void, because they contravene those principles. . . . '' Privacy of Communications Case (Klass Case), BverfGE 30, 1 (1970): ''The purpose of Article 79, paragraph 3, as a check on the legislator's amending the Constitution is to prevent the abolition of the substance or basis of the existing constitutional order, by formal legal means of amendment . . . and abuse of the Constitution to legalize a totalitarian regime.'' Fundamental constitutional alteration is not prohibited as long as it meets the criterion of coherence. ''Restrictions on the legislator's amending the Constitution . . . must not, however, prevent the legislator from modifying by constitutional amendment even basic constitutional principles in a system-immanent manner.'' If proximity to the abyss has a way of concentrating the mind on the essentials of constitutionalism, judicial enforcement of implied limits to the amendment power should not rest solely on reasons fashioned for the dire circumstances of the worst case. For Schmitt, it was the doctrine of popular sovereignty traceable to the French Revolution that animated his views on the subject, just as it did his defense of executive dictatorship. 59 Perhaps it was the tragically induced awareness of the multiple ends the doctrine could serve that led the German Court to emphasize, as a basis for the conceptual possibility it had countenanced, the further idea of preserving the ''inner unity'' of the Constitution. Thus a constitutional amendment could be subject to nullification to the extent that it was responsible for transforming the document to which it was added into something fundamentally incoherent.
Of the raft of reasons adduced by the Indian Court in analyzing the unconstitutional amendment, the one that stands out is a version of the coherence requirement-the need to preserve the Constitution's identity. If anything, however, it is a more demanding criterion than the German test. Thus the incongruities and inconsistencies that could lead to a finding of constitutional incoherence might only mean that the document's identity has been obscured in a manner that seemingly casts doubt on its fundamental character and commitments. Also, the exigencies of constitution making often lead to an original constitution's incoherence, in the sense that necessary compromises produce contradictions affecting its ''inner unity'' even before any subsequent amending hand is laid upon it. That is certainly the U.S. story, and in its finest moment article 5 served the nation well by enabling its fundamental law to begin the process of working itself pure.
Reforming a constitution is, as Walter F. Murphy has pointed out, different from re-forming a constitution. 60 The latter, one might say, extends beyond incoherence and implicates identity. Aristotle, in speaking of the polis, asked, ''On what principles ought we to say that a state has retained its identity, or, conversely, that it has lost its identity and become a different State?'' 61 His answer was that a polis's identity changes when the constitution (referring to more than just a document) changes as the result of a disruption in its essential commitments, much as a chorus is a different chorus when it appears in a tragedy rather than a 59 Schmitt's thoughts on popular sovereignty and constitutional change are well treated in Peter comedy. 62 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, to speak of identity is to refer to that condition or fact that makes something unique, especially as a continuous unchanging property throughout its existence. This follows the account of the eighteenth-century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid and his observation that ''Continued uninterrupted existence is . . . necessarily implied in identity.'' 63 As it has evolved in Indian jurisprudence, the meaning of a constitutional amendment has essentially conformed to these definitions of identity. Thus in Kesavananda, Justice H.R. Khanna, the author of the decision's most important opinion, wrote: ''The word 'amendment' postulates that the old constitution survives without loss of its identity despite the change and continues even though it has been subjected to alterations. '' 64 In Minerva Mills, Justice P.N. Bhagwati, one of the last holdouts against the idea of implied limits, argued: ''If by constitutional amendment, Parliament were granted unlimited power of amendment, it would cease to be an authority under the Constitution, but would become supreme over it, because it would have power to alter the entire Constitution including its basic structure and even to put an end to it by totally changing its identity.'' 65 The question of constitutional identity is, of course, much more easily asserted than enforced. Given the exceedingly high probability that any such assertion will be vigorously contested, judges are understandably reluctant to enforce it. This is because ''[i]solating the mechanism that makes invocations of identity . . . persuasive would take us into deep philosophical waters.'' 66 While such an exercise could prove quite beneficial, the safer judicial route would be to avoid these waters entirely. Thus in the U.S. case Coleman v. Miller Justice Hugo Black said of the article 5 process that it ''is 'political' in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point. These last words belong to Edmund Burke, whose reflections on the dramatic changes in one country have unfortunately obscured his decades of engagement in the transformation of others. In South Asia, where some said he stubbornly-others prefer tenaciously-championed the rights of Indians against the numerous depredations of the British Empire, he is given more regard as a visionary thinker, albeit one whose gaze was never fully diverted from the past. 74 There are approving references in the One of the justices in the Indira Gandhi case, in speaking of the principles of the rule of law, pointed out that they ''must vary from country to country depending on the provisions of [the] constitution.'' 81 Burke's second track concerns this variability, which is about the identity of a particular constitution. In his speech on the reform of representation, delivered just one year before his better known speech on the East India Bill, Burke explained why he favored the idea of the prescriptive constitution: ''Because,'' he said, ''a nation is not an idea of local extent, but is an idea of continuity, which extends in time as well as in numbers, and in space. And this is a choice not of one day, or one set of people, not a tumultuary and giddy choice; it is a deliberate election of ages and generations; it is a Constitution . . . made by the peculiar circumstances, occasions, tempers, dispositions, and moral, civil, and social habitudes of the people, which disclose themselves only in a long space of time. It is a vestment, which accommodates itself to the body. '' 82 It is tempting, though mistaken, to think of Burke as a precursor of modern moral relativism, even if excerpts like this illuminate why some have held that view. His emphasis on particularities and prescription-that is, the constitutional principle of inheritance-and on the constitution as something that evolves to fit the circumstances and habits of a people, is surely suggestive of a moral sensibility strongly deferential to entrenched cultural norms. But the deference was not unqualified, as illustrated in Burke's rejection of Hastings's main argument for his morally questionable actions in India. Hastings had framed a defense of ''geographical morality,'' which held that whatever happened in India was compatible with local customs and, therefore, could not be judged by external standards. Burke While there were preconditions for a constitution to exist, the nation as an ''idea of continuity'' meant that constitutions had to be viewed as embodiments of unique histories and circumstances. ''I never was wild enough to conceive that one method would serve for the whole; that the natives of Hindostan and those of Virginia could be ordered in the same manner. . . .'' 84 One would never mistake the constitutional identities of these wildly divergent peoples, just as one would not confuse the aesthetic identities of an ornate eighteenth-century French writing table and its minimalist twentieth-century Finnish counterpart. 85 The accommodation of the vestment to the body implied a tolerance for diverse practices; abstract theory could not dictate constitutional form or identity. One can debate whether Burke was too permissive in the span of constitutional variability he imagined as compatible with legitimate rule. The point is that the Burkean understanding of constitutions as artifacts of time and experience supplies the necessary background assumption for Justice Khanna's critically important criterion for the legitimacy of an amendment: that the old constitution survive without loss of its identity. Survival depends on successfully pursuing the inquiry into constitutional essentials. In the philosophical literature the relationship between survival which establishes the prescriptive force of the commitments included in the document. Thus the principle of secularism may be understood as an element of the basic structure of the Constitution, and, as such, may not be subject to amendment, although a specific provision intended to configure secular relations in a particular way may be changed within the constraints of the broader principle. The variability of changing conditions may necessitate modifications in the structure and design of particular institutions, as well as in the manner in which these institutions interact with one another and with other agents, but the transient character of formal arrangements must reflect the larger purposes and principles that are the continuous and unalterable thread of constitutional identity. This is a point well made by the astute scholar of Burke Gerald Chapman who points out that the House of Commons, for example, need not as a matter of prescriptive requirement assume any particular form, even though the basis for the existence of the House ''authorizes its permanence as a principle in the constitution.''
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And so we might think of an amendment as a new chapter in an ongoing constitutional story. How well it fits the existing narrative will be a factor in assessing its quality; it may, like the Fourteenth Amendment in Ireland or the proposed flag burning amendment in the United States, raise concerns about coherence, or what Ronald Dworkin refers to as ''integrity. '' 92 But if the lack of fit is so extreme as either to call into question whether the addition has subverted the genre itself-for example, is it still a novel?-or to lead one to conclude that a key element of the plotline has been disregarded, then the legitimacy of the undertaking might well be placed in doubt.
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Constitutionally, these two possibilities translate into first-and second-order amendment defects. Both are serious, even if the culturally contingent elements of the latter reduce somewhat the urgency of the need to impose implied limits. Thus an amendment that assaulted the very foundations of constitutionalism would be direr than one that challenged some constitutional practice or tradition of particular importance to a given regime. It must be emphasized, however, that it is not the introduction of significant and far-reaching change that is per se objectionable; rather, it is the content of this change insofar as it implicates the question of constitutional identity. Indeed, Burke, whose resistance to change has often been exaggerated, wryly pointed out, in that same speech on representation, that when a man
